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Abstract
Forecasting elections — a challenging, high-stakes problem — is the subject of much uncertainty, subjectivity,
and media scrutiny. To shed light on this process, we develop a theory for forecasting elections from the perspective
of dynamical systems. Our model borrows ideas from epidemiology, and we use polling data from United States
elections to determine its parameters. Surprisingly, our general model performs as well as popular forecasters for
the 2012 and 2016 U.S. races for president, Senate, and governor. Although contagion and voting dynamics differ,
our work suggests a new approach to elucidate how elections are related across states. It also illustrates the effect
of accounting for uncertainty in different ways, provides an illuminating example of data-driven forecasting using
dynamical systems, and suggests avenues for future research on political elections. We conclude with our forecast of
the senatorial and gubernatorial races on 6 November 2018, which we posted on 5 November.
Introduction
Despite what was largely viewed as an unexpected outcome in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, recent work [1]
suggests that national polling data is not becoming less accurate. Election forecasting is a complicated, multi-step
process, and it often comes across as a blackbox. It involves polling members of the public, identifying likely voters,
adjusting poll results to incorporate demographics, and accounting for other data (such as historical trends). The presence
of correlations between states with shared demographics further complicates the picture and adds to the challenge of
forecasting elections [2]. The result is a high-stakes, high-interest problem that is rife with uncertainty, incomplete
information, and subjective choices [3]. In this paper, we develop a new forecasting method based on dynamical systems
and compartmental modeling, and we use it to help unpack U.S. election forecasting.
Two primary types of data are used to forecast elections: polls and “fundamental data”. Fundamental data consists of
different factors on which voters may base their decisions [4]; it includes economic data, party membership, and various
qualitative measurements (e.g., how well candidates speak) [5, 6]. Mainstream forecasting sources (such as newsletters
and major media websites) offer varying levels of detail about their techniques and often rely on a combination of polls
and fundamental data. Some analysts forecast vote margins at the state or national level (e.g., [7–10]), while others
(e.g., [11–14]) call outcomes by party without giving margins. (We will refer to the former approaches as “quantitative”
and the latter as “qualitative”, though quantitative data is typically used in both settings.) Among quantitative forecasters,
it is important to distinguish between those who aggregate publicly available polls from a range of sources and those
who gather their own in-house polls (e.g., The Los Angeles Times [9]). For example, FiveThirtyEight [7] is a poll
aggregator known for its pollster ratings; they weight polls more heavily from sources that they judge to be more accurate
[2]. After adjusting polls to account for factors such as recency, poll sample, convention bounce, and polling source,
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FiveThirtyEight uses state demographics to correlate random outcomes, such that similar states are more likely to behave
similarly [2].
In the academic literature, many statistical models (e.g., [3,6,15]) combine different variables — including state-level
economic indicators, approval ratings, and incumbency — to forecast elections. See [16] for a review. Although some
of these methods [15, 17] blend polls and fundamental data, Abramowitz’s Time for Change model [18] and the work
of Hummel and Rothschild [6] rely on fundamental data without using any polls. Models that are based on fundamental
data alone can provide early forecasts, as they do not need to wait for polling data to become available, but these forecasts
are not dynamic; they do not measure current opinion. To provide both election-day forecasts and estimates of current
opinion, Linzer [19] augmented fundamental data with recent polls using a Bayesian approach. Although the media often
stresses daily variance in polls as election campaigns unfold, the political-science community has cautioned that such
fluctuations are typically insignificant and may represent differences in technique between polling sources, rather than
true shifts in opinion [4,20,21]. Therefore, to account for nonrepresentative poll samples or house bias that is inherent in
the methods of any given polling source, some statistical models [21, 22] adjust and weight the polling data in different
ways (e.g., in a similar vein to FiveThirtyEight [2]). Alternatively, Wang [23] took a simpler approach, relying on poll
aggregation to reduce error and produce accurate forecasts.
Although there is extensive work on mathematical modeling of political behavior (e.g., [24–27]) and opinions more
generally [28, 29], most such studies have focused on opinion dynamics or on questions that are related tangentially to
elections, rather than on engaging with data-driven forecasting. For example, Braha and de Aguiar [27] and Ferna´ndez-
Gracia et al. [24] combined generalized voter models with data on election results to comment on vote-share distributions
and correlations across U.S. counties. In a series of papers (e.g., [30,31]), Galam demonstrated how to use a sociophysics
approach (without reliance on polls or fundamental data) to suggest race outcomes and shed light on the dynamics that
may underlie various election results.
Accounting for interactions between states is crucial for producing reliable forecasts, and Nate Silver [2] has stressed
the importance of correlating polling errors by state demographics. Lauderdale and Linzer [3] have also noted that
correlating state outcomes by geography may be particularly useful for forecasts that depend on polling data. These
methods, which one can view as indirectly incorporating relationships between states through noise, relies on state
similarity, which is inherently an undirected quantity. For example, if Ohio and Pennsylvania are viewed as similar by
FiveThirtyEight, so are Pennsylvania and Ohio. However, it is possible that states influence each other in directional
ways. For example, voters in Ohio may more strongly influence the population in Pennsylvania than vice versa. The
strength at which states influence each other can arise from where candidates are campaigning, the people with whom
voters in various states interact, what distant states are featured prominently in the news, which states most resonate with
local voters, and other reasons. Linzer [19] estimated national-level influences on state voters on a daily basis using a
statistical modeling approach, but we are not aware of prior work that has estimated directed, asymmetric state–state
relationships or of poll-based forecasting approaches that take a mathematical modeling perspective.
To make election forecasting more transparent, broaden the community that engages with polling data, and raise
research questions from a dynamical-systems perspective, we therefore propose a data-driven mathematical model of the
evolution of political opinions during U.S. elections. We utilize a poll-based, poll-aggregating approach to specify model
parameters, allowing us to provide quantitative forecasts of the vote margin by state. To help motivate questions, we
consider simplicity a strength and thus do not weight or adjust the polling data in any way. Following Wang’s example
[23], we strive to be fully transparent; we provide all of our code, data, and detailed reproducibility instructions in the
Supplementary Materials. We have a special interest in exploring how states influence each other, and (because it provides
a well-established and interdisciplinary way to frame such asymmetric relationships) we borrow techniques from the
field of disease modeling. Using a compartmental model of disease dynamics, we treat Democrat and Republican voting
intensions as contagions that spread between states. Our model performs well at forecasting the 2012 and 2016 races;
and we use it to forecast the 6 November 2018 U.S. governor and Senate elections. (We posted our forecasts [32] on
the arXiv on 5 November 2018.) For the 2018 Senate races, we also explore how early we can make accurate forecasts;
promisingly, we find that our model is able to produce stable forecasts from early August onward. Most importantly,
our model demonstrates how one can employ mathematical tools (e.g., dynamical systems, uncertainty quantification,
and network analysis) to help demystify forecasting, explore how subjectivity and uncertainty impact forecasting, and
suggest future research directions in the study of political elections.
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Fig. 1: Overview of our modeling approach. (A) A susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS) compartmental model
tracks the number of susceptible (S(t)) and infected individuals (I(t)) in a community in time; these quantities evolve
according to infection and recovery. We repurpose this approach by including two types of infections (Democrat and
Republican voting inclinations), interpreting infection as opinion adoption, and replacing recovery with turnover of
committed voters to undecided ones. (B) We assume that individuals interact within and between states. In this cartoon
example, Ohio and Pennsylvania can influence each other, but voters in Nevada and Pennsylvania do not interact. (C)
Example model dynamics: Democrat voting inclination in Ohio leading up to the 2012 presidential election. We take
the mean of the polls by month to obtain the data points that we show as purple asterisks. We specify parameters by
minimizing the difference between our model [3–5] and these monthly data points. We simulate the evolution of opinions
in the year leading up to each election, but we focus on the result at time t = 0 days to the election. (D) For elections with
many state races, we combine all reliable Republican and Democrat regions into two “superstates” (in Red and Blue, as
we use traditional party colors). We show the superstates for presidential elections; see Table S1 for the superstates that
we use in other elections.
Results
Because we repurpose our forecasting approach from compartmental modeling of disease dynamics [33–35], we begin
with an introduction to these techniques. We then construct a model of party choices in elections in the form of a
compartmental model, and we use it to simulate governor, Senate, and president elections in 2012, 2016, and 2018. Our
code and the data sets that we used in our model are available as Data files S1, S2, and S3.
A general, interdisciplinary framework: compartmental modeling of infections
Compartmental models [33–38] are a standard mathematical approach for studying biological contagions. Developed
initially for analyzing the spread of diseases such as influenza [39], contagion models (which are often combined with
network structure to incorporate social connectivity [40, 41]) have also been used to study social contagions [42, 43].
This family of models is built on the idea that one can categorize individuals into a few distinct types (i.e., “compart-
ments”). One then describes contagion dynamics using flux terms between the various compartments. For example, the
susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS) model divides a population into two classes. At a given time, an individual can
be either susceptible (S) or infected (I). As we illustrate in Fig. 1A, the fraction of susceptible and infected individuals in
a community depends on two factors:
• transmission: when an infected individual interacts with a susceptible individual, the susceptible person has some
chance of becoming infected; and
• recovery: an infected person has some chance of recovering (and becoming susceptible again).
Suppose that S(t) and I(t), respectively, are the fraction of susceptible and infected individuals in a well-mixed
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population at time t. One then describes infection spread by the following set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
dS
dt
= γI︸︷︷︸
recovery with rate γ
− βSI︸︷︷︸
infection with rate β
, (1)
dI
dt
= −γI + βSI , (2)
where S(t) + I(t) = 1 and γ and β correspond to the rates of disease transmission and recovery, respectively. (For
details, see the Supplementary Materials.) The SIS model has been extended to account for more realistic details, such
as multiple contagions, communities, and contact structure between individuals or subpopulations [40, 41, 44, 45].
Our election model
Our election dynamics model is a two-pronged SIS compartmental model (see Fig. 1A). First, we reinterpret “suscepti-
ble” individuals as undecided (or independent or minor-party) voters. Because most U.S. elections are dominated by two
parties, we consider two contagions: Democrat and Republican voting intentions. We track these quantities within each
state (and make the assumption that populations are well-mixed within each state). Let
Si = fraction of undecided voters in state i ,
IiD = fraction of Democrat voters in state i ,
IiR = fraction of Republican voters in state i ,
where IiD + I
i
R + S
i = 1. We account for four behaviors:
• Democrat transmission: an undecided voter can decide to vote Democrat due to interactions with Democrats (note
that we interpret “interactions” and “transmission” broadly, as discussed below);
• Republican transmission: an undecided voter can decide to vote Republican due to interactions with Republicans;
• Democrat turnover: an infected person has some chance of changing their mind to undecided (this amounts to
“recovering”); and
• Republican turnover: an infected person has some chance of becoming undecided (i.e., recovering).
Although the language of contagions does not necessarily apply to social dynamics [46], we find it useful to use it in
this paper. These terms highlight that our model is not a specialized election model, as part of our goal is to show how a
general framework can give meaningful forecasts in high-dimensional systems. We thus expect similar ideas to provide
insight into forecasting in many complex systems.
By extending the traditional SIS model [1–2] to account for two contagions and M states or “superstates” (see
Fig. 1D), we obtain the following ODEs:
dIiD
dt
(t) = −γiDIiD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dem. loss
+
M∑
j=1
βijD
N j
N
SiIjD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dem. infection
, (3)
dIiR
dt
(t) = −γiRIiR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rep. loss
+
M∑
j=1
βijR
N j
N
SiIjR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rep. infection
, (4)
dSi
dt
(t) = γiDI
i
D + γ
i
RI
i
R −
M∑
j=1
βijD
N j
N
SiIjD −
M∑
j=1
βijR
N j
N
SiIjR , (5)
where N is the total number of likely voters in the U.S.; N j is the number of likely voters in state j; and γiD and γ
i
R
describe the rates of committed Democrat and Republican voters, respectively, converting to undecided. Similarly, βijD
and βijR correspond, respectively, to the transmission (i.e., influence) rates from Democrat and Republican voters in state
j to undecided individuals in state i. We obtain our parameters by fitting to a year (or less, in the case of our earlier 2018
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forecasts) of state polls (averaged by month to remove small-scale fluctuations; see Fig. 1C) from HuffPost Pollster [47]
and RealClearPolitics [48]; see Materials and Methods for details. We take measurements of the number of voting-age
individuals per state from the Federal Register [49–51], and we assume that all states have the same voter turnout, so this
parameter cancels out of our model. Our parameters are different for each election, as we use the data specific to each
election for fitting.
The β parameters allow for us to model directed relationships (as a form of network structure) between states, and
we take a broad interpretation of “transmission”. Although opinion persuasion (i.e., transmission) can occur through
communication between undecided and committed voters [52], we expect that it can also occur through campaigning,
news coverage, and televised debates. We hypothesize that these venues are an indirect means for voters in one state to
influence another. For example, if news coverage of Republican campaigning in Pennsylvania resonates with undecided
voters in Ohio, there may be an associated indirect route of opinion transmission from Pennsylvania to Ohio. Therefore,
we consider large βijR to signify that Republicans in state j strongly influence undecided voters in state i, and such “strong
influence” may be due either to conversations (or other direct interactions) between voters or due to indirect effects like
state–state affinity that is influenced (or activated) by media.
After we fit our parameters to polls for a given election, we use our model [3–5] to simulate the daily evolution of
political opinions from the preceding January through election day. In such simulations, we use the earliest available
polling data to specify our initial conditions (see Materials and Methods). We do not claim that our approach is the most
accurate forecasting method; instead, we are putting forward a data-driven model that admittedly involves many simpli-
fications, some of which are instructive to mention before we discuss our simulation results. Important simplifications
include the following:
• While generally not realistic, we assume voters mix uniformly (e.g., everyone has the same influence on everyone
else), aside from the state structure (which is analogous to patches in epidemiology); accounting for additional
network structure may improve forecasts [53–55].
• We combine all sources of opinion adoption into time-independent transmission parameters βijR and βijD .
• If undecided voters remain at the end of our simulation, we assume that they vote for minor-party candidates or do
not vote.
• We assume that all polls are equally accurate. Unlike FiveThirtyEight [2], we do not weight polls more strongly
based on recency or make any distinction between partisan and non-partisan polls (or polls of likely voters, regis-
tered voters, or all adults). Notably, Wang [23] has shown that, when aggregated, polling data may not need to be
weighted or adjusted to account for polling source to be accurate.
Despite these simplifications, our model surprisingly performs as well as popular forecasters, as we illustrate next.
Overview of election simulations
We now use our model in Eqns. [3–5] to simulate past races for governor, Senate, and president. Because realistic
forecasts should incorporate uncertainty, we follow this exploration of past races with a short study of the impact of
noise on our 2016 presidential forecast. To do this, we introduce a stochastic differential equation (SDE) version of our
model; and we then use our SDE model to forecast the gubernatorial and senatorial midterms on 6 November 2018.
2012 and 2016 election forecasts
By fitting our parameters to polling data for senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential races in 2012 and 2016 without
incorporating the final election results, we can simulate forecasts as if we made them on the eve of the respective election
days. In Fig. 2, we summarize our forecasts for these races. As we show in Table 1, our model has a similar success rate
at predicting (“calling”) party outcomes at the state level as popular forecasters FiveThirtyEight [56] and Sabato’s Crystal
Ball [11]. For example, our mean accuracy for presidential elections in 2012 and 2016 is 94.1%, while FiveThirtyEight
and Sabato’s Crystal Ball achieved mean success rates of 95.1% and 93.1%, respectively.
Figure 2 and Table 1 highlight two forecasting goals: (1) estimating the vote share by state (e.g., the percents of the
state vote that are received by Democrat and Republican candidates), and (2) calling the winning party by state (i.e.,
which party’s candidate wins the election in a given state). Many qualitative forecasters (e.g., [11, 13]) focus on the
second goal, whereas our model and FiveThirtyEight [7] pursue both goals.
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Fig. 2: Simulations of Eqns. [3–5]. We calculate our 2012 and 2016 forecasts using polling data up until election day;
they do not include any election results, and they should be interpreted as forecasts from the night before an election.
Comparison of our forecasts for (A, D) governor, (B, E) Senate, and (C, F) president elections with election results
from [57, 58]. The horizontal axis shows the percentage-point lead by Democrats (blue) or Republicans (red); shorter
bars represent closer elections, and bars that extend to the right (respectively, left) correspond to Republican (respectively,
Democrat) leads. We highlight the states that we forecast incorrectly in bold, italic green font. “Safe Red” and “Safe
Blue” refer to superstates that are composed, respectively, of reliably Republican-voting and Democrat-voting states.
(We assemble the superstates based on forecaster opinions and historical data; see Materials and Methods for details.)
See Table S1 for the list of states that each superstate consists of for each election.
Accounting for and interpreting uncertainty
Election forecasting involves not only calling a race for a specific party and estimating vote shares, but also specifying
the likelihood of different outcomes. This raises a third goal of forecasters, (3) quantifying uncertainty (e.g., estimating
a given candidate’s chance of winning an election). We suggest that this is one of the key places where mathematical
techniques can contribute to election forecasting. We explore randomness by generalizing our model [3–5] to a system
of SDEs:
dIiD(t) =
−γiDIiD + M∑
j=1
βijD
N j
N
SiIjD

︸ ︷︷ ︸
deterministic dynamics in Eqn. [3]
dt+ σdW iD(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty
, (6)
dIiR(t) =
−γiRIiR + M∑
j=1
βijR
N j
N
SiIjR
 dt+ σdW iR(t) , (7)
dSi(t) =
γiDIiD + γiRIiR − M∑
j=1
βijD
N j
N
SiIjD −
M∑
j=1
βijR
N j
N
SiIjR
 dt+ σdW iS(t) , (8)
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Table 1: Comparison of success rates∗ for our model in Eqns. [3–5] and two popular sources. We report success
rates for governor and Senate elections based only on the states for which forecasts are available from our model (see
Table S1 and the Supplementary Materials). For FiveThirtyEight [56], we use the 2016 polls-only forecast.
Election FiveThirtyEight [56] Our model Sabato [11]
2016 President 90.2% 88.2% 90.2%
2016 Senate 90.9% 87.9% 93.9%
2016 Governor NA 91.7% 83.3%
2012 President 100% 100% 96.1%
2012 Senate NA 90.3% 93.5%
2012 Governor NA 100% 77.8%
where we now consider IiD, I
i
R, and S
i to be stochastic processes and let W iD,W
i
R, and W
i
S be Wiener processes. We
select the noise strength σ to roughly match our 80% confidence intervals to those of FiveThirtyEight [56].
Sources of uncertainty and error in election forecasting include sampling error and systematic bias from the specific
methods of different polling sources [2, 19, 21, 23]. For concreteness and simplicity, we focus on accounting for errors
based on shared demographics. Although U.S. elections are decided at the level of states, polling errors are correlated
in regions with similar populations [2]. Thus, if a pollster is wrong in Minnesota, they may be off in states (such as
Wisconsin) with shared features [2]. This type of error makes it possible for polls of a bloc of states to all be wrong
together, leading to an unforeseen upset. To explore these dynamics, we compare the impact of uncorrelated noise
with the effect of additive noise correlated on a few sample demographics; specifically, we consider the fractions of
Black, Hispanic, and college-educated individuals in a population (see Materials and Methods). We correlate on these
demographics because these data are readily available; future work should incorporate additional data.
We account for uncertainty by tweaking the populations in each state at every time step by a small random number;
when noise is uncorrelated, we pick these numbers independently. By contrast, correlated noise implies that the numbers
are related in similar states. Simulating many (e.g., we use 10, 000) elections then results in a distribution of possible
outcomes and allows us to quantify uncertainty. As an example, we show the distributions that result from these methods
for the 2016 presidential race in Fig. 3.
Our initial analysis illustrates how accounting for uncertainty in different ways influences forecasts, echoing points
raised by Nate Silver and his team [2]. In Fig. 3, we demonstrate that uncorrelated noise, which can model uncertainty in
a single state or a poll without assuming a larger systematic (e.g., country-wide) polling error, results in a low likelihood
of a Republican win in 2016. By contrast, correlating outcomes by demographics, which can model systematic polling
errors (e.g., due to misidentifying likely voters) in similar states, increases Donald Trump’s chances by a factor of about
four. This agrees with Silver’s comment [2] that failing to account for correlated errors tends to result in underestimations
of a trailing candidate’s chances. As we discuss in the Supplementary Materials, it is worth noting that, due to an indexing
error in one of our files, in an earlier version of our model, we correlated state outcomes on the demographics of the
wrong states. After correcting this error, we obtained similar results, suggesting that it is the mere presence of correlated
noise that improves Trump’s chances and this noise does not need to be correlated by the specific state demographics
(namely, the fractions of Black, Hispanic, and college-educated individuals in a population) that we used. Lauderdale and
Linzer [3], for example, have suggested state outcomes are correlated by geography, and FiveThirtyEight [2] correlates
on party, region, and religion, as well as race, ethnicity, and education.
In our analysis, we do not attempt to account directly for errors in polls. Instead, we take the simple approach of
assuming that we can incorporate all sources of uncertainty as an additive noise term in our model [6–8]. There has
been extensive work on quantifying uncertainty (see [59]); exploring alternative ways of accounting for uncertainty is an
important future direction for research on forecasting complex systems.
2018 Senate and governor forecasts
The 2018 midterms provided a fantastic opportunity for us to test our model. Our final forecasts, which we [32] posted on
5 November (the night before the 2018 elections), rely on polls gathered from RealClearPolitics [48] through 3 November
and are based on the SDE version of our model [6–8]. (There is a time delay between when polls are completed and
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Fig. 3: Impact of incorporating uncertainty in different ways, as demonstrated by our simulations for the 2016
U.S. presidential election. (A) Uncorrelated additive white noise gives Trump less than a 5% chance of winning the
electoral college, whereas (B) correlating noise by state demographics increases his chance of winning to about 22%. (We
generate distributions by simulating 10, 000 elections using Eqns. [6–8] with σ = 0.0015; see Materials and Methods
for details about our correlated noise.)
when the data becomes available from RealClearPolitics [48]. The latest polls in our governor and Senate data sets
were completed on 1 November and 2 November, respectively. Note that polls do not always become available in the
temporal order of polling day (e.g., RealClearPolitics [48] occasionally updates their website with additional early polls,
despite their prior posting of more recent polls), so this does not imply that our data include all of the polls up until these
dates.) We account for uncertainty by correlating noise on education, ethnicity, and race (as in Fig. 3B) and average
across 10, 000 simulated elections to obtain our forecasts (Because of computational time constraints, we based our
original Senate forecast from 5 November on fewer than 10, 000 simulations and used a larger time step than usual for
parameter fitting. Additionally, after checking our polling data without the election-day rush, we found several typos that
we have corrected for the forecasts in the main text. See the Supplementary Materials for details. We include our original
forecasts [32] from 5 November 2018 in Figs. S1–S3. In the main text, we instead present the forecasts that we obtain
using our typical simulation parameters. Importantly, both of these forecasts project the same candidate to win in each
state.) In Fig. 4 and S4, we compare our governor and Senate forecasts with those of several popular sources. Our results
in Table 2 are based only on the states that we treat individually in our model. (Note that, for the governor races, our Safe
Red superstate consists of AL, AZ, AR, ID, MD, MA, NE, NH, SC, TN, TX, VT, and WY; and our Safe Blue superstate
consists of CA, CO, HI, IL, MI, MN, NM, NY, PA, and RI. For the Senate races, our Safe Red superstate gives the mean
behavior of the MS, MS*, NE, UT, and WY races; and our Safe Blue superstate consists of CT, DE, HI, ME, MD, MA,
MI, MN, NM, NY, PA, RI, VT, VA, and WA.) Given the probabilistic nature of forecasts, it is not straightforward to
evaluate their accuracy [62], and we use the 2018 races to discuss a few ways of quantifying forecast performance.
For quantitative forecasters, one natural way of evaluating performance is by computing the error in the forecasted
vote margin by state. For example, as shown in Fig. 4A, we forecast that the Democrat candidate (Gillum) would win the
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Fig. 4: 2018 forecasts. We base our forecasts on 10, 000 elections that we simulate using Eqns. [6–8]. (A) Our 2018
governor forecasts based on polls collected from RealClearPolitics [48] through 3 November in comparison to FiveThir-
tyEight’s 6 November forecasts (according to the “classic” version of their algorithm) [7] and the election results [60].
The bold, italic green font indicates state races that we called incorrectly. The length of the bars that extend to the right
and left, respectively, indicate the mean percent lead by the Democrat and Republican candidate. (B, C) Categorizations
of the states (other than the ones that are Safe Red or Safe Blue) as Solid, Likely, Lean, or Toss-up by our model, the
Cook Political Report [13], Inside Elections (IE) [14], Sabato’s Crystal Ball [61], RealClearPolitics [48], and FiveThir-
tyEight [7]) for the governor races in (B) and the Senate races in (C). IE [14] breaks down their ratings to include a
“Tilt” category. Our model and [7] provide numbers to quantify uncertainty. For toss-up states, the number or text is
red (respectively, blue) if it corresponds to a Republican’s (respectively, Democrat’s) chance of winning. We indicate
each election outcome by the color of the state name. In (C), we do not forecast the MN special (MN*) election in July,
because this race had no polls before August.
Florida gubernatorial race by 0.4 percentage points over the Republican nominee (DeSantis), whereas FiveThirtyEight
projected that Gillum would win by 4.2 points. DeSantis edged out Gillum by 0.4 points, so our margin of error was
0.8 points and FiveThirtyEight’s was 4.6 points for this specific race. In comparison, the mean margins of error that
were reported in the polls [48] on which we based our parameters were 4.1 and 4.0 for the governor and Senate data,
respectively. Critically, this reported error is sampling error only; it does not account for other sources of error, such as
ones from unrepresentative polling samples, which can result in error that is correlated by demographics [62]. Across
the 2018 races we forecast individually in Fig. 4, FiveThirtyEight’s forecasts were roughly 1 percentage point closer on
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Table 2: Final forecast performance for the 2018 governor and Senate races. We measure performance by mean
error in vote margin, number of state races missed or not called, and log-loss error, which describes how well uncertainty
is captured. We use final forecasts, and we note that lower numbers indicate better performance. These measurements
are for the races in Figs. 4B and 4C and they do not include the states that we combined into the Safe Red and Safe Blue
superstates. (Additionally, see the Supplementary Materials and Tables S2 and S3.)
Forecaster 2018 Governor Races 2018 Senate Races
Margin
error
Races
missed
Races not
called
Log-loss
error
Margin
error
Races
missed
Races not
called
Log-loss
error
(% points) (# states) (# states) (% points) (# states) (# states)
Our model 4.1 4 0 0.590 4.6 3 0 0.400
538 [7] 3.1 4 0 0.548 3.7 3 0 0.410
Sabato [61, 63] NA 3 1 0.585 NA 1 0 0.379
Cook [13] NA 0 12 0.670 NA 0 9 0.553
IE [14] NA 2 3 0.619 NA 1 1 0.415
RCP [48] NA 0 12 0.647 NA 0 8 0.565
average to the real vote margins than our model. While straightforward, the drawback of measuring accuracy by vote
margin is that one can apply this method only to quantitative forecasters (see Table 2).
The baseline measure of how well forecasters do at calling race outcomes — specifically, of whether a state will elect
a Republican or a Democrat — often attracts media attention. As we illustrate in Table 2, 2018 was a good year for a
couple of the well-known pundits who use qualitative approaches: Sabato’s Crystal Ball [63] was the most successful at
calling outcomes. The quantitative forecasts of our model [6–8] and FiveThirtyEight tied for second place (along with
Inside Elections [14]). We both missed the same 4 governor races and 2 of the same Senate races; additionally, we missed
Tennessee and FiveThirtyEight missed Florida [7]. The Cook Political Report [13] and RealClearPolitics [48] performed
worse by this measurement because they left many races as toss-ups.
As we show in Figs. 4B and 4C, there is a lot of variability in how strongly different sources forecast each state race.
A helpful measure to evaluate classification models is logarithmic loss [64], which rewards strong correct forecasts and
penalizes strong incorrect forecasts. It is given by
log loss = − 1
E
E∑
j=1
(yi log pi + (1− yi) log (1− pi)) ,
where E is the number of states that we treat individually (so E = 13 and E = 14 for the 2018 governor and Senate
races, respectively), yi = 1 if the projected candidate wins in state i and yi = 0 otherwise, and pi is the probability (see
the percentages in Figs. 4B and 4C) that we assign to the projected winning candidate in state i. For qualitative forecast
categorizations, we specify pi = 0.5 for Toss-up, pi = 0.55 for Tilt, pi = 0.675 for Lean, pi = 0.85 for Likely, and
pi = 0.975 for Solid. As we show in Table 2, our forecasts from Eqns. [6–8] rank second and third (for the Senate and
governor races, respectively) among our example popular forecasters according to log-loss error. In comparison to the
log-loss errors in Table 2, a log-loss error of 0.7 corresponds to a hypothetical forecast that assigns a 50% chance to
every race.
Thus far, we have focused largely on producing final forecasts, in part because public attention often centers on
how forecasts from the eve of an election compare to race outcomes and in part because our work is a first step toward
data-driven election forecasting from a dynamical-systems perspective. It is important to note, however, that the most
meaningful forecasts are those in the weeks and months leading up to an election day, and there is particular value in
forecasts that remain stable across time [16, 19, 23]. Moreover, forecasting early is a particularly challenging problem
and provides a more comprehensive view of model value [19]. To begin to address these ideas, we show earlier forecasts
for the 2018 races in Fig. 4B and 4C. We base these forecasts on less polling data. (For example, our 8 July forecast uses
polling data up until and including 8 July.) We use the same superstate categorizations in our earlier forecasts as we do
in our final forecasts, which rely on the categorizations of popular forecasters in August and November (see Materials
and Methods). Notably, our July, August, September, and October forecasts of swing states in the Senate races are as
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accurate at calling race outcomes as our final forecasts (see Fig. 4C). As the election nears and we incorporate more
polling data into our model, our performance, measured by log-loss error and vote-margin error, improves. This supports
observations [17, 20] that polling data becomes more reliable over time. In comparison to Table 2, we miss the true vote
margin by 6.7, 5.8, and 5.0 percentage points on average in August, September, and October, respectively. Similarly,
our log-loss error decays in time (0.56 in August, 0.53 in September, and 0.44 in October). For the governor elections,
our model calls the same state outcomes roughly 2 weeks out from the election as it does in November. In comparison,
Sabato’s Crystal Ball [63] and Inside Elections [14] both left 5 states as toss-ups in October, and FiveThirtyEight [7]
missed 4 states a week before the election. Studying election dynamics is an important direction of future research, and
we raise a few questions in this area in the Discussion.
Discussion
We developed a general mathematical modeling method for forecasting elections by adapting ideas from compartmental
modeling and epidemiology; and we illustrated the promise of such a dynamical-systems approach by applying it to
the U.S. races for president, Senate, and governor in 2012 and 2016. When making our modeling choices, we tried to
avoid incorporating specificity into our methodology. Despite our approach of using poll data without any weighting
adjustments, as well as clear differences between contagion spreading and voting dynamics, we achieved similar success
rates as popular forecasters at calling final race outcomes. Moreover, we were able to forecast the outcomes of the Senate
elections in 2018 using polling data prior to August 2018 with the same accuracy as FiveThirtyEight’s final forecast [7].
This heartening result suggests that our approach is promising.
We consider our model’s generality and interdisciplinary, borrowed nature a virtue in this initial dynamical-systems
effort, as part of our goal is to help demystify election prediction, highlight future research directions on the forecasting of
elections (and other complex systems), and motivate a broader research community to engage more actively with pollster
interpretations and polling data. There are many ways to build on our basic modeling approach and more realistically
account for voter interactions.
To give one example, it will be useful to be more nuanced about how to handle undecided and minor-party voters.
FiveThirtyEight [2] assigns a voting opinion (mostly to one of the major parties) to any undecided voters who remain
on election day, and the The Huffington Post factors undecided voters into an election’s uncertainty [8]. By contrast,
we assumed that any undecided voters left at the end of our simulations are either minor-party voters or simply do
not vote. Using the fraction of undecided voters to inform our choice of noise strength is an interesting direction to
pursue. Moreover, because we compare our model with some popular qualitative forecasters, we showed our forecasts as
projected vote margins rather than absolute Republican and Democrat percentages. It may be desirable for future studies
to look more closely at how the fractions of Republicans, Democrats, and undecided voters evolve in time as in [19,22].
We assumed that all polls are equally accurate (e.g., we did not consider the time to election and pollster-reported
error), and we did not distinguish between partisan and non-partisan polls or between polls of likely voters, registered
voters, and adults. This minimal, poll-aggregating approach echoes the work of Wang [23]. By contrast, FiveThirtyEight
[2] relies on measures [65] of polling-firm accuracy to weight polls, and they adjust polls of registered voters and adults
to frame all of their data in terms of likely voters. Using FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings [65] to weight polls in our
model would allow us to explore how the various subjective choices of forecasters determine their predictions. Similarly,
future work can compare the influence of noise that is correlated from demographics with the effects of noise that is
correlated based on the last 80 years of state voting history. (The Huffington Post [8] uses the latter.)
In this initial study of election dynamics from a poll-based, dynamical-systems perspective, we took a macroscopic,
simplified view of state and voter interactions. We chose to base our approach on compartmental modeling of contagion
spreading because it gives a well-established, multidisciplinary way to include asymmetric state–state relationships in our
model. However, when a social behavior or opinion appears to spread in a community, it is often difficult to determine
whether transmission is actually occurring. In particular, the appearance of “spreading” may emerge because social
contagions are truly spreading between individuals (that is, individuals are influencing each other) or because people
form relationships with others who are similar to them and behave in a similar way (e.g., adapting the same opinion) due
to their shared characteristics [66]. By building more detailed mathematical models of voter behavior in the future, one
can help elucidate what role influence plays in political opinion dynamics.
Our model assumes that every voting-age individual is equally likely to interact with any other voter in the U.S.
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While this mean-field approach fits within the theme of simplicity that we embraced throughout our modeling process,
the assumption of uniform mixing is not particularly realistic [53–55]. For example, several celebrities were heavily
involved in encouraging individuals to vote in 2018, and they have more prominent platforms than a typical voter.
Accounting for realistic network structures and exploring frameworks other than compartmental models (e.g., voter
models [24,27], local majority-rule models [26,30], and threshold models [46]) may better capture relationships between
voters. Network models may also allow future studies of how different methods, such as “big nudging” [67, 68], may
influence voter turnout and behavior at the individual level.
It will also be useful to incorporate additional types of data (e.g., measurements of partisan prejudice by county [69]),
as they become available, into election models to improve both the detail and quality of forecasts. Our model works
on the level of states because state polling data is available; in comparison, House elections are polled much less,
making fundamental data more important for these races [70]. Although precinct-level data is available on presidential
election results (e.g., see [71]), we are not aware of polls at the precinct level. Because many states have regions (e.g.,
metropolitan versus rural areas) with different voting behavior, precinct-level polling data has the potential to lead to
significant improvements in forecasts.
When fitting our parameters, we averaged polls [47, 48] by month (see Materials and Methods). This technique
smooths out daily fluctuations that may be more representative of sampling error than real shifts in opinion [21], but
it may also throw out interesting dynamics, such as those that occur around party conventions [19]. (As described by
FiveThirtyEight [2], candidates often receive a spike in support after their party’s convention.) The impact of campaigns
and media coverage on opinion dynamics is debated in the political-science community [4, 17, 20]. With a finer view on
polls, one can explore the possible effects of such time-specific events (e.g., a large rally or a story about a candidate in
the media) using our modeling framework. Similarly, one can build feedback mechanisms into a model to test how the
perception of future election results influences an individual’s likelihood of voting. The framework of dynamical systems
provides a valuable approach for exploring the time evolution of opinions, as well as their interplay with external forces
(such as the media, rallies, and conventions).
Our compartmental-model approach allowed us to obtain parameters that are related to the strengths of interactions
between states and measurements of voter turnover by state for each election year and race (see Figs. S5–7). By com-
paring these parameters across years and different types of elections, one can help identify blocs of states that are related
persistently, analyze which states have the most plastic voter populations, and suggest differences in the political dy-
namics in presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial races. One can also use our parameters from previous elections to
provide early forecasts for upcoming races prior to when large-scale polling data becomes available. These and other
future research directions could provide insight into how state relationships evolve across years, allowing researchers to
identify ways that the U.S. electorate may be changing in time and, in turn, suggest valuable ideas to incorporate into
future forecasts.
Materials and Methods
Data sets
We obtained publicly-available state polling data for 2012 and 2016 from HuffPost Pollster [47] using their Pollster API
v2 [72]. State polling data for 2018 was not available from HuffPost Pollster [47], so we collected 2018 data by hand
from RealClearPolitics [48]. We use 2012, 2016, and 2017 estimates of voting-age population sizes from the Federal
Register [49–51] to specify N and N i in Eqns. [3–8]; we use 2017 data for 2018, because 2018 measurements were not
yet available at the time of our analysis.
Selecting superstates
We focus on forecasting elections in swing states and treat all reliably Red and Blue states together as two “superstate”
conglomerates. (We do not specify that these superstates actually vote Republican and Democrat, respectively; rather,
that is an output of our models.) This raises the question of how to identify states as “safe” or “swing”, and we do this
differently for different elections. For presidential races, we define our swing states as those identified by FiveThirtyEight
as “traditional swing states” [73]; these are CO, FL, IA, MI, MN, NV, NH, NC, OH, PA, VA, and WI (see Fig. 1D). Thus,
12
for the presidential elections, M = 14 in Eqns. [3–8]; {S1, I1D, I1R} and {S2, I2D, I2R} refer to the voters in the Red and
Blue superstates, respectively; and {Si, IiD, IiR} with i = 3, 4, . . . , 14 are the voter fractions in the 12 swing states.
To define superstates in Senate and governor races, we average the forecasts of popular forecasters. For the 2018
Senate races, we combine the August 2018 ratings of Sabato’s Crystal Ball [63], 270toWin (the consensus version) [12],
and the New York Times [10]. Our 2018 governor race categorizations are based on FiveThirtyEight [7], the Cook
Political Report [13], Sabato’s Crystal Ball [61], and Inside Elections [14] accessed on 1 November 2018. We base our
categorizations for the 2012 Senate races on Sabato’s Crystal Ball [74] and the New York Times [75]. We base our 2016
Senate categorizations on 270toWin [12], Sabato’s Crystal Ball [11], and The Huffington Post [8]. We treat every state
separately for the 2012 and 2016 governor races. See Table S1 and the Supplementary Materials for details.
Uncertainty
The noise strength in Eqns. [6–8] is σ = 0.0015 for all our “probabilistic forecasts” (namely those which use the SDEs
[6–8]). We choose σ so that our 80% confidence intervals have a similar length as those in FiveThirtyEight’s 2016 polls-
only presidential forecasts [56]. (We approximate the latter’s 80% confidence intervals as ranging between 13 and 19
percentage points in length.) We base each probabilistic forecast but one on 10, 000 simulations of Eqns. [6–8]. (The
only exception is our forecast in Figs. S1B and S1C, which we base on 4, 000 simulations.) For the forecasts in Figs. 3B,
4, and S4, we include correlated noise in Eqns. [6–8]. We quantify the similarity of 2 states using the Jaccard index
J = min{Di, Dj}/max{Di, Dj}, where Di is the fraction of a given demographic in state i and Dj is the fraction
for that demographic in state j. The Jaccard index indicates the covariance for W iR and W
i
S. We consider 3 sample
demographics: JB, JE, and JH are the Jaccard indices that we find using the fractions of Non-Hispanic Black individuals,
individuals without a college education, and Hispanic individuals, respectively. We calculate JB and JE using 2016 U.S.
Census Bureau [76] data and base JH on data from 247WallSt.com [77]. We obtain JB, JE, and JH for the superstates by
averaging the demographics of these states. (Note that we do not weight these averages by state size.) For our forecasts
with correlated noise, each time that we simulate an election, we select one Jaccard index uniformly at random among
JB, JE, and JH to use as our covariance. Thus, for each such simulated election, we may randomly tweak a set of states
with a similar feature (e.g., high Hispanic population) in the same direction (e.g., in favor of the Democrat candidate) at
one time.
Parameter fitting
To fit model parameters for a given election (e.g., the 2012 Senate races), we first format the associated polling data. First,
we assign each poll a time point by averaging its start and end dates. Because some states are polled more frequently
than others, we reduce the number T of polling data points that we use to fit one of our models to T = 11 per state (or
superstate) for our November forecasts. We do this by binning the polls for each state in 30-day increments that extend
backward from the appropriate election day (6 November 2012, 8 November 2016, or 6 November 2018). (We made one
adjustment to this rule for the 2012 presidential race: for this race, our earliest bin includes polls from between 400 and
300 days until the election if there are no polls within 330 days of the election; in all other cases, our earliest bin includes
polls between 330 and 300 days to the election.) For our earlier forecasts in Fig. 4B and 4C, we use a smaller subset of
the polling data. For example, to forecast the Senate elections on 7 August, we bin the polling data that falls between
330 and 90 days of the election in 30-day increments to obtain T = 8 bins. We then average within these bins to arrive
at T data points per state. If a given state has no polls within a bin, we approximate the associated data point by linear
interpolation. In many cases, there are no polls for a state early in the year, so we set all missing early data points for
that state to its earliest data point. To arrive at T data points each for the Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates, we average
across the T individual data points for each of the states within these conglomerates. (We weight these averages by the
state voting-age population sizes.)
We let {Rj(ti), Dj(ti), U j(ti)}i=1,...,T denote the T data points for state j that we obtain through the above process.
The variables Rj(ti), Dj(ti), and U j(ti) are the fractions of Republicans, Democrats, and others in state j at time point
ti. To describe our fitting procedure, we define a “concentration” vector
C(ti) = [R1(ti), . . . , RM (ti), D1(ti), . . . , DM (ti), U1(ti), . . . , UM (i)] ,
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where M is the number of states and superstates that we forecast for the given election (see Table S1). For a candidate
set of parameters, (β, γ) = {βjkR , βjkD , γjR, γjD}j,k=1,...,M , we define cβ,γ to be the solution of Eqns. [3–5] under these
parameters:
cβ,γ(t) = [I1R(t), . . . , I
M
R (t), I
1
D(t), . . . , I
M
D (t), S
1(t). . . . , SM (t)] .
We obtain our parameters (βˆ, γˆ) for the given election by minimizing the least-squares deviation between the averaged
polling data and the solutions of Eqns. [3–5] at the T time points considered:
(βˆ, γˆ) = argmin
(β,γ)
T∑
i=1
‖C(ti)− cβ,γ(ti)‖22 .
These estimators are consistent and converge weakly to Gaussian laws if data is from a density-dependent Markov jump
process [78]. Note that we fit our parameters using the deterministic version of our model [3–5]. To simulate elections,
we use these parameters in Eqns. [3–5] and the SDE version of our model, which we showed in Eqns. [6–8]. In each
figure caption, we indicate the version of our model that we used for simulations in that figure.
Numerical implementation
For parameter fitting, we use the OPTIM routine in R (version 3.4.2) [79] to perform constrained optimization of the
least-squares objective function, subject to non-negative rate constraints [80] with time step ∆t = 3 days. We use this
time step in all cases, except for the forecasts in Figs. S1B and S1C (for which we use ∆t = 15 days). We simulate
our models in MATLAB (VERSION 9.3), THE MATHWORKS, INC., NATICK, MA, USA. For each state (or superstate),
we set its initial condition to the earliest of its 11 data points used for parameter fitting. We solve Eqns. [3–5] using a
forward Euler scheme and Eqns. [6–8] with the Euler–Maruyama method [81]. We use that Si + IiR + I
i
D = 1 to reduce
our system to 2 equations per state (or superstate) for our simulations. The time step in both cases is ∆t = 0.1 day, and
we simulate from 1 January until an election day assuming months of length 30 days. (We simulate for 306 days for
2012 and 2018 races and for 308 days for 2016 races.)
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Supplementary Materials1
Original Forecasts that we Posted on 5 November 20182
We posted our forecasts for the 2018 Senate and governor races on the arXiv preprint server at [32] on 5 November, the3
eve of the midterm elections that were held on 6 November 2018. We collect these original forecasts in Figs. S1, S2,4
14
and S3. After checking our results without the election time rush, we found that we made some errors when gathering5
the data. These errors, which we have corrected in the forecasts that we present in the main text (although note that our6
original forecasts and those in the main manuscript forecast the same candidates to win each race), are as follows:7
• We incorrectly copied the results for the last Rhode Island Senate poll, which took place 20–24 October 2018.8
Because we include Rhode Island in our “Safe Blue” superstate, this error led to a difference of less than 0.59
percentage points in the Republican and Democrat percentages at one time point in the “Safe Blue” data that we10
used to fit model parameters.11
• We neglected to incorporate the only Washington poll in our Senate data into the polling data that we averaged for12
the “Safe Blue” superstate.13
• We incorrectly copied the Republican vote share for the last Maine governor poll, which took place 27–29 October;14
instead of using 42%, we had 37%.15
• Instead of correlating noise for each state in Eqns. [6–8] using its associated demographic information as described16
in Materials and Methods, we incorrectly ordered the demographic information in one file, such that we were not17
associating the correct demographic data to each state. This error does not have a strong impact on our forecasts,18
suggesting that the critical point is to correlate noise in some way and that this way does not necessarily need to19
be by demographics.20
These errors occur only in Figs. S1, S2, and S3. Additionally, because of time constraints, we generated our final Senate21
forecasts (based on data from [48] that we gathered through 3 November), which we show in Fig. S1B and S1C, using a22
time step of 0.5 months for parameter fitting and based on only 4, 000 simulated elections. In all other cases, we specify23
a time step of 0.1 months for parameter fitting and base our forecasts on 10, 000 simulated elections. Note that we use24
the deterministic version our model (which we show in Eqns. [3–5]) to fit parameters and the stochastic version of our25
model (in Eqns. [6–8]) to simulate the 2018 elections.26
Special Cases and Notes27
Working with election data is often messy, and we comment on a few special cases in our work.28
(1) Different election days: Unlike the other 2012 races, the Wisconsin 2012 governor election took place in June29
2012, so we do not forecast this race.30
(2) Single-party races: California had two Democrats running for Senator in 2018 and 2016. Because our model31
assumes a race of a Democrat facing a Republican, we do not use polling data from states with a single-party race32
or forecast these races.33
(3) Independent candidates: The Vermont senatorial races featured an Independent running in place of a Democrat in34
2012 and 2018. For the 2012 election, we chose not to forecast Vermont for this reason. For the 2018 race, we35
treated the Independent as a Democrat in our model so that we could still provide a forecast for Vermont.36
(4) Third-candidate polling data: We focus on polling data that compares two candidates. In particular, we do not37
include polls that report data for races in which there are three or more candidates who each get reasonably large38
shares of the vote. The polls that we found from RealClearPolitics [48] for New Mexico’s 2018 senatorial race39
were for three candidates, so we do not include New Mexico’s polls in our averaged data points for the Safe Blue40
superstate for this election. We also do not forecast the Maine 2012 senatorial race because it included three41
popular candidates.42
(5) No polls: In some elections, one or more states have no polls. If these states lie in our Safe Red or Safe Blue43
superstates, this is not an issue, as we simply assign them the vote margin of the appropriate superstate. However,44
in elections for which we forecast each state individually, we cannot forecast states without polling data. Therefore,45
because polling data from HuffPost [47, 72] were not available for the Delaware and West Virginia 2012 governor46
races, we do not provide forecasts of these races.47
(6) Early forecasts: For our 8 July forecasts of the 2018 Senate races in Fig. 4C, the Minnesota special election had48
no polls prior to 8 July, so we remove this race from our model for this forecast only.49
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Alternative Ways of Measuring Forecast Accuracy50
Because it is not straightforward to measure forecast accuracy [62], it is important to discuss how subjective choices51
enter this process and influence how we view different forecasts. In this section, we highlight a few alternative choices52
(related to Tables 1 and 2 in the main text) that we could have made when evaluating forecast accuracy.53
As we note in Table S1 and just discussed above, we do not forecast single-party races (namely, the California Senate54
races in 2016 and 2018). Depending on the forecast goal, such single-party races either lead immediately to forecast55
success or are as difficult to forecast as any other race. For example, because two Democrats ran in the California Senate56
race in 2018, we could have chosen to forecast this as a Safe Blue state. If our goal is to call state results by color,57
we can construe such a forecast as a success; however, if our goal is to determine the winning candidate in each state,58
such a forecast is meaningless. When measuring accuracy, this leaves us with several choices. Should we calculate (and59
potentially inflate) forecast accuracy measurements by counting single-party state races as immediate forecast successes?60
Should we count these single-party races as failures unless a forecaster identifies the winning candidate? Should we61
calculate forecast accuracy based only on races that have candidates from two or more parties? We employ the third62
option (leaving single-party state races out of forecast accuracy measurements both for our model and for the popular63
forecasters) throughout our work. This choice influences the success rates that we report for the 2016 and 2018 Senate64
races slightly because of California, which featured a single-party race in both of these years.65
As we discussed earlier, in a few cases, we do not provide a forecast for a specific state race, because either it has66
no polling data [47], it includes more than two popular candidates, or it has an independent candidate who is running67
against a Republican (in 2012). These observations again leave us with choices to make when we measure accuracy.68
Should we evaluate our forecasts and those of popular sources by calculating success rates only for the state races that69
we forecast? Alternatively, should we evaluate success rates across all of the (non-single-party) state races (and thus70
count our model as failing to make a correct prediction for states that we do not even attempt to forecast)? We present71
success rates based on the former option in Table 1 in the main text. (In particular, across the states for which forecasts72
are available from our model, we forecast 89.1% of 64 state Senate races in 2012 and 2016 correctly; Sabato achieved73
a success rate of 93.8%. Our forecasts have a mean accuracy of 95.2% for the 21 governor races that we forecast74
in 2012 and 2016, for which Sabato’s predictions averaged 81.0% success.) Instead choosing the latter option yields75
different success rates for the 2012 governor and Senate races. Specifically, because Sabato’s Crystal Ball [74] correctly76
forecast the Delaware and West Virginia governor races that we could not forecast due to lack of polling data, their77
2012 governor success rate at calling state outcomes increases to 81.8% (with 9 state outcomes called correctly out of78
11 races), where we leave Wisconsin out of these calculations, because its election was held several months earlier than79
the other elections. Our 2012 governor race accuracy goes down to 81.8% (with 9 state outcomes called correctly and 280
races not forecast). Similarly, because Sabato’s Crystal Ball [74] correctly forecast the 2012 Maine and Vermont Senate81
races that we did not forecast, their accuracy increases to 93.9% (with 31 state outcomes called correctly out of 33), and82
our accuracy decreases to 84.8% (with 28 state outcomes called correctly and 2 races not forecast) when we choose to83
evaluate performance across all state races. Because our current methodology limits us to forecasting races for which84
polling data are available, measuring accuracy across all states highlights the value of fundamental data, which is used85
by Sabato’s Crystal Ball [74] to provide forecasts even when there is not polling data.86
Because of our use of superstates, we also need to make subjective choices in our measurements of vote-margin87
error in Table 2 in the main text. Specifically, when we combine select states into Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates,88
we forecast the mean Democrat and Republican vote percentages across these states. This leaves us with three choices89
for calculating our vote-margin error and comparing it with that of FiveThirtyEight [7]. Option (1) is to apply our90
strategy to FiveThirtyEight’s forecasts. For example, we can calculate their mean vote margins across the state races in91
our superstates, weighted by the number of voting-age individuals in each state. This is the technique that we used in92
Figs. 4A. Option (2) is to treat the Safe Red and Safe Blue means that we forecast as if they are the forecast margins93
in each state individually. For example, if we forecast the Safe Red superstate to go +18 points Republican, we can94
interpret this result as meaning that each of the individual states in the Safe Red superstate is +18 points Republican).95
Option (3) is to evaluate the vote-margin error for FiveThirtyEight [7] and our model only on the set of states that we96
treat individually. We use this third option in Table 2. As alternative measurements, we include margin errors that we97
calculate using options (1) and (2) in Table S2. It is important to note that, although all of the states in our Safe Red98
(respectively, Safe Blue) superstate voted Republican (respectively, Democrat) in the elections that we considered, the99
vote margins were rather different in some of these states, even though they all voted for the same party. Therefore, in100
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comparison to FiveThirtyEight [7], our model performs worst if we choose option (2), because FiveThirtyEight forecasts101
each state individually.102
Because of our use of superstates, we face similar subjective choices in how we calculate log-loss error in Table 2103
in the main text. We do not specify that the Safe Red (respectively, Safe Blue) superstate be categorized as “Solid Rep.”104
(respectively, “Solid Dem.”). Instead, this result is an output of our model after we simulate 10, 000 elections with105
Eqns. [6–8]. For example, for the 2018 Senate race, we obtain a Republican outcome for the Safe Red superstate in106
100% of our simulations and a Democrat outcome for the Safe Blue superstate in 99.99% of our simulated elections. For107
the 2018 governor races, a Republican wins in the Safe Red superstate in 99.94% of our simulations, and a Democrat108
wins in the Safe Blue superstate in 99.42% of our simulations. We can calculate the log-loss error of our forecasts and109
those of popular sources in a few different ways. Option (1) is to apply our strategy to the forecasts of popular sources110
by averaging across their individual state categorizations to obtain categorizations in terms of our superstates. Option (2)111
is to treat our Safe Red and Safe Blue categorizations as if they apply individually to each state in the superstates. For112
example, because we categorize the Safe Red superstate as Solid Red, we can interpret this result as meaning that each113
individual state in the Safe Red superstate is Solid Red. Option (3) is to evaluate the log-loss error for our model and114
popular forecasters only for the set of states that we treat individually. We use the third option in Table 2 in the main text.115
As alternative measurements, we include margin errors calculated using options (1) and (2) in Table S3.116
Additional Model Details117
The dynamics of transmission and recovery in the traditional susceptible–infected–susceptible (SIS) model are described
by the following coupled ordinary differential equations:
dS˜
dt
= γI˜ − β˜[S˜I˜] ,
dI˜
dt
= −γI˜ + β˜[S˜I˜] ,
where S˜(t) and I˜(t), respectively, are the mean numbers of susceptible and infected individuals in a population at time t
and [S˜I˜] is the mean number of connections between infected and susceptible individuals. To close the system [40], we
approximate the number of connections as [S˜I˜] ≈ S˜ ·n · I˜/N , where N is the total number of individuals in a population
and n is the mean number of connections per person. If we define β = β˜n, we obtain the following system:
dS˜
dt
= γI˜ − βS˜I˜/N ,
dI˜
dt
= −γI˜ + βS˜I˜/N .
Writing this system in terms of the population fractions, S(t) = S˜(t)/N and I(t) = I˜(t)/N , and dividing by N yields118
Eqns. [1–2].119
A similar process yields our two-pronged deterministic SIS model (see Eqns. [3–5] in the main text) for election
forecasting. The key difference is how we define [SiIjD] and [S
iIjR]. Specifically,
[S˜iI˜jD] = S˜
i · n · (N j/N) · (I˜jD/N j) ,
[S˜iI˜jR] = S˜
i · n · (N j/N) · (I˜jR/N j) .
We thereby estimate the number of interactions between undecided voters in state i and Democrats in state j, for example,120
as the mean number of interactions that involve an undecided voter in state i multiplied by the probability that the121
interaction is with someone in state j multiplied by the probability that someone in state j is a Democrat. In making122
these approximations, we are assuming that an undecided voter is equally likely to interact with a Republican or Democrat123
across the U.S. In particular, we do not assume that interactions are more likely between individuals in the same state or124
between those in neighboring states. We assume that the number of interactions between individuals in different states125
depends only on the voting-age populations [49–51] of the states and on the number of Republicans, Democrats, and126
undecided voters currently therein.127
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Model Parameters128
In Table S1, we give a summary, for each election, of the states that we forecast individually and those that we combined129
into the Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates. We determine all other model parameters that we use in Eqns. [3–5] and130
[6–8] from the main text by fitting Eqns. [3–5] to public polling data [47, 48] (as described in Materials and Methods).131
We give these parameter values in Data file S4 (also see Data file S1 for code and directions on how to reproduce our132
model parameters). To simulate the stochastic-differential-equation (SDE) version of our model (see Eqns. [6–8]), we use133
demographic data on the fractions of Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and college-educated individuals in each state from134
the U.S. Census Bureau [76] and 247WallSt.com [77]. These data sets are publicly available from [76, 77]. Voting-age135
population sizes N i (for i = 1, . . . ,M ) are available from the Federal Register [49–51] for each election.136
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Fig. S1: Our original 2018 Senate forecasts posted on 5 November [32]. (A) Forecast for the Senate composition
based on Eqns. [6–8] (on 24 October 2018) using correlated noise. (B) State categorizations as Solid, Likely, Lean, or
Toss-up by our model in Eqns. [6–8], FiveThirtyEight [7], Sabato’s Crystal Ball [63], and the Cook Political Report [13].
We generated our 3 November forecasts using polls from [48] through 3 November 2018. (We only categorize states
that we have not already designated as “Safe Red” or “Safe Blue”; see Table S1 for details.) Each number indicates the
chance of a Democrat (respectively, Republican) winning if it is in a blue (respectively, red) box. For toss-up states,
each number is red (respectively, blue) if it corresponds to a Republican’s (respectively, Democrat’s) chance of winning.
FiveThirtyEight’s values are based on the “classic” version of their model that was updated at 1:19 PM Eastern Time on
4 November. (C) Map of the state ratings as forecast by our model using data through 3 November. We generate our
forecasts by simulating Eqns. [6–8] 10, 000 times for (A) and the first column of (B) and 4, 000 times for (C) and the last
column of (B). For the forecasts in (C) and the rightmost column in (B), we used a time step for parameter fitting that is
five times larger than what we use in our other forecasts.
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Fig. S2: Vote margins for our original 2018 forecasts posted on 5 November [32]. (A) Our forecasts (based on
data we collected from RealClearPolitics [48] through 24 October 2018) are shown versus those of FiveThirtyEight [7]
for the 2018 Senate races. (We show the FiveThirtyEight forecasts from their “classic” model; we obtained them on
30 October at 1:06 PM Eastern Time.) We use “*” to designate the Minnesota special election. See Table S1 for a
summary of the states that we include in our Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates. (B) Our 2018 governor forecasts are
based on polling data that we collected from RealClearPolitics [48] through 3 November. We also show the forecasts
of FiveThirtyEight [7] on 4 November 2018. (The margins that we reproduce from their website are from the “classic”
version that was updated at 4:50 PM Eastern Time on 4 November.) Here we show the expected margins only for swing
states; we forecast the mean margin in the Safe Red superstate to be +18.5 points for Republicans and the mean margin
in the Safe Blue superstate to be +15.6 points for Democrats. We generate our forecasts in (A, B) by simulating 10, 000
realizations of Eqns. [6–8]. Bars signify the mean vote percentages across these stochastic simulations.
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Fig. S3: Our original 2018 governor forecasts posted on 5 November [32]. We generate our forecasts by simulating
10, 000 realizations of Eqns. [6–8]. (A) Illustration of our governor forecasts based on data from RealClearPolitics [48]
through 3 November 2018. (On the map, we show only states that held gubernatorial elections.) (B) We compare
our categorizations of states as Solid, Likely, Lean, or Toss-up with those of popular forecasters. (Note that we only
categorize states that we have not already assigned to the Safe Red or Safe Blue superstates; see the caption of Fig. S2
for details.) The forecasts that we reproduce from FiveThirtyEight [7] are for their “classic” version, which was updated
at 1:19 PM Eastern Time on 4 November 2018. We obtained the forecasts that we reproduce from Sabato’s Crystal
Ball [61], the Cook Political Report [13], and Nathan Gonzales’s Inside Elections (IE) [14] from their websites on
4 November. They were last updated online on 26 October, 26 October, and 1 November, respectively. IE [14] further
breaks down their state ratings to include a “Tilt” category, which appears between “Toss-Up” and “Lean”.
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Fig. S4: 2018 Senate forecasts.We base our forecasts on 10, 000 elections that we simulate using Eqns. [6–8] with noise
correlated on state demographics. Forecasts are based on polls collected from RealClearPolitics [48] through 3 November
in comparison to FiveThirtyEight’s 6 November forecasts (according to the “classic” version of their algorithm) [7] and
the election results [60]. (We use asterisks to mark the MN special election.) The bold, italic green font indicates state
races that we called incorrectly. The length of the bars that extend to the right (in red) and left (in blue), respectively,
indicate the mean percent lead by the Democrat and Republican candidate (and 0 represents a tie). Narrow orange bars
indicate the region in which 80% of our simulated election results fall.
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Fig. S5: Republican transmission parameters for our 2018 Senate forecasts. We provide the parameters that we
use in Eqns. [6–8] to simulate elections for our final forecasts in Data file S4. (In this figure, we show the parameters
to 6 decimal places; see Data file S4 for more precise numbers.) As an example, this figure shows the Republican
transmission parameters (in units of 1/month) for our 2018 senatorial forecasts using polling data that we obtained
from [48] through 3 November 2018. We obtain these parameters by fitting the deterministic version of our model (see
Eqns. [3–5]) to polling data. To simulate elections, we use these parameters in the stochastic version of our model (see
Eqns. [6–8]). The parameter βijR describes opinion transmission from Republicans in state j to undecided voters in state
i. To clarify our notation, we highlight βFL,TXR in the table; this parameter describes the influence that Republicans in
Texas had on undecided voters in Florida.
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Fig. S6: Democrat transmission parameters for our 2018 Senate forecasts. We give the parameters that we use in
Eqns. [6–8] to simulate elections for our final forecasts in Data S4. (In this figure, we show the parameters to 6 decimal
places; see Data file S4 for more precise numbers.) As a second example, this figure shows the Democrat transmission
parameters (in units of 1/month) for our 2018 senatorial forecasts using polling data that we obtained from [48] through
3 November 2018. We obtain these parameters by fitting the deterministic version of our model (see Eqns. [3–5]) to
polling data. To simulate elections, we use these parameters in the stochastic version of our model (see Eqns. [6–8]).
The parameter βijD describes opinion transmission from Democrats in state j to undecided voters in state i.
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Fig. S7: Turnover parameters for our 2018 Senate forecasts. As an example of our turnover (e.g., recovery) parame-
ters — namely, γiR and γ
i
D in Eqns. [3–8] — we show the Republican and Democrat turnover parameters that use in our
2018 Senate simulations. (We base these parameters on polling data that we obtained from [48] through 3 November
2018.) The first column gives our γiR parameters, which describe the rate at which Republicans become undecided (in
units of 1/months), and the second column gives γiD, the rate at which Democrats become undecided (again, in units of
1/months). To further clarify our notation, note that γTXR describes the rate at which Texas Republicans become unde-
cided. These parameters suggest that committed voters do not typically change their minds within an election year. One
can interpret 1/γix (where x ∈ {D,R}) as the mean time that “committed” voters stay committed to their opinion before
becoming undecided [43]. Our parameter values suggest that the least committed voters in the 2018 Senate races were
New Jersey Democrats, yet 1/γNJD ≈ 1.57 years is still a long time on the scale of one election. We show the parameters
to 6 decimal points; for additional precision (and the parameters that we use to simulate other elections), see Data File
S4.
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Table S1: Summary of model treatment of each state race by election and year. Depending on the election, we
combine some states into Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates (see Materials and Methods). In some cases, we do not
provide a forecast for a given state. (For example, we do not forecast state races in which the two main candidates
are from the same party.) In all other cases, we forecast each state race individually. We designate the Minnesota and
Mississippi Senate special elections using asterisks. For the special case of our July forecasts of the 2018 Senate races in
Fig. 4C, we forecast only 13 states individually. (We remove MN* from our model, because it has no polling data prior
to 8 July.)
Election States forecast indi-
vidually (#)
States in the Safe Red su-
perstate (#)
States in the Safe Blue su-
perstate (#)
States not fore-
cast (#)
2012 Governor IN, MO, MT, NH,
NC, ND, UT, VT,
WA (9)
(0) (0) DE, WV, WI (3)
2012 Senate AZ, CT, FL, IN, MA,
MO, MT, NV, ND,
OH, PA, VA, WI (13)
MS, NE, TN, TX, UT, WY
(6)
CA, DE, HI, MD, MI,
MN, NJ, NM, NY, RI, WA,
WV (12)
ME, VT (2)
2012 President CO, FL, IA, MI, MN,
NV, NH, NC, OH,
PA, VA, WI (12)
AL, AK, AZ, AR, GA,
ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, MS,
MO, MT, NE, ND, OK,
SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WV,
WY (23)
CA, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL,
ME, MD, MA, NJ, NM,
NY, OR, RI, VT, WA (16)
(0)
2016 Governor DE, IN, MO, MT,
NH, NC, ND, OR,
UT, VT, WA, WV
(12)
(0) (0) (0)
2016 Senate AZ, FL, IL, IN, LA,
MO, NV, NH, NC,
OH, PA, WI (12)
AL, AK, AR, GA, ID, IA,
KS, KY, ND, OK, SC, SD,
UT (13)
CO, CT, HI, MD, NY, OR,
VT, WA (8)
CA (1)
2016 President CO, FL, IA, MI, MN,
NV, NH, NC, OH,
PA, VA, WI (12)
AL, AK, AZ, AR, GA,
ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, MS,
MO, MT, NE, ND, OK,
SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WV,
WY (23)
CA, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL,
ME, MD, MA, NJ, NM,
NY, OR, RI, VT, WA (16)
(0)
2018 Governor AK, CT, FL, GA, IA,
KS, ME, NV, OH,
OK, OR, SD, WI (13)
AL, AZ, AR, ID, MD,
MA, NE, NH, SC, TN,
TX, VT, WY (13)
CA, CO, HI, IL, MI, MN,
NM, NY, PA, RI (10)
(0)
2018 Senate AZ, FL, IN, MN*,
MO, MT, NV, NJ,
ND, OH, TN, TX,
WV, WI (14)
MS, MS*, NV, UT, WY
(5)
CT, DE, HI, ME, MD,
MA, MI, MN, NM, NY,
PA, RI, VT, VA, WA (15)
CA (1)
26
Table S2: Alternative ways of computing the mean error in vote margin for the 2018 governor and Senate races.
We show the mean error in vote margin for our model in Eqns. [6–8] and FiveThirtyEight [7]. Because of our use of
superstates, we identify three ways of measuring vote-margin error. In option (1), we calculate the mean vote margins
that FiveThirtyEight forecast across the states in our superstates (essentially, we construct FiveThirtyEight’s superstate
forecasts using their individual state forecasts), and we compute the mean vote-margin error based on these superstate
vote margins and the remaining individual state vote margins. In option (2), we treat the superstate vote margins that
we forecast as if they apply to each state individually. (For example, if we forecast the Safe Red superstate to go +18
points Republican, we interpret this as meaning that each state in our Safe Red superstate goes +18 points Republican.
This option allows us to compute FiveThirtyEight’s mean vote-margin error based on all of the state races individually.
We showed the mean vote-margin error that we computed using option (3) in Table 2 in the main text. For option (3),
we reported the mean vote-margin error for our model and FiveThirtyEight based only on the states that we forecast
individually. We do not include the single-party California Senate race in any of these measurements. It is insightful to
compare this table to Table S3.
Forecaster Our SDE model (see Eqns. [6–8]) FiveThirtyEight [7]
Gov. error by Option (1) 3.8 pts. 3.0 pts.
Gov. error by Option (2) 5.5 pts. 3.5 pts.
Sen. error by Option (1) 4.3 pts. 3.7 pts.
Sen. error by Option (2) 6.5 pts. 4.0 pts.
Table S3: Alternative ways of computing log-loss error for the 2018 governor and Senate races. Also see Table 2
and Table S2. As we discussed in the text of the Supplementary Materials, our use of superstates yields a few options
for computing log-loss error. Briefly, in option (1), we average across the individual state race forecasts of popular
forecasters to obtain their forecasts for our Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates We then use these superstate forecasts,
together with the forecasts of the states that we treat individually, to compute log-loss error. In option (2), we treat
our superstate forecasts as if they apply individually to each state in these superstates. (For example, if the Safe Red
superstate goes Republican in 100% of our stochastic simulations of Eqns. [6–8], we interpret this result as meaning that
every individual state in the Safe Red superstate has a 100% chance of a Republican outcome.) We showed the log-loss
error that we compute using option (3) in Table 2. For option (3), we reported the log-loss error for our model and
popular forecasters only for the states that we forecast individually. We do not include the single-party California Senate
race in any of these measurements.
Forecaster Our SDE model (see Eqns. [6–8]) FiveThirtyEight [7] Sabato [61, 63]
Gov. log loss by Option (1) 0.511 0.480 0.522
Gov. log loss by Option (2) 0.215 0.221 0.284
Sen. log loss by Option (1) 0.347 0.364 0.337
Sen. log loss by Option (2) 0.163 0.184 0.175
Data file S1: Simulation code, demonstration files, and reproducibility instructions: datafile Code and Demos.zip.
This zipped folder contains all of the code that we developed to fit model parameters and simulate the model, as well as
instructions for reproducing all of the quantitative measurements that we presented in the figures and tables in the main
manuscript. In the zipped folder, the file readme.txt provides further details and instructions. In particular, the folder has
13 Excel documents with polling data that we collected for 2012, 2016, and 2018 from HuffPost [47] and RealClearPol-
itics [48], as well as the demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau [76] and 247WallSt.com [77] that we used to
correlate state outcomes in our 2018 forecasts. We provide 3 main code files: (1) formattingPollData.m formats the poll
data (averaging polls by month and combining state data into superstate data when appropriate); (2) parameterFitting.R
fits parameters using the formatted poll data; and (3) electionModel.m simulates our models in Eqns. [3–8]. For repro-
ducibility, we also include code (reproduceTablesFigures.m) that produces all of the quantitative measurements in the
manuscript and a text file (reproduceDataFiguresTables.txt) with instructions on how to use this code. Lastly, demo.txt
and the subfolder DemoFiles provide details on how to run short code demonstrations and verify the output.
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Data file S2: Polling data for the 2018 Senate races: datafile SenatePolls2018.xlsx. This is an Excel file with the
polling data that we collected from RealClearPolitics [48] for the 2018 Senate races. Each page in the worksheet
corresponds to one state. Column A has the projected vote shares (i.e., their percentage of the votes) for the Repub-
lican candidate; Column B has the projected vote shares for the Democrat candidate; Column C has the poll sample
number; Column D has the poll name; Columns E and F, respectively, have the poll start and end dates (formatted as
month/day/year); Column G has the poll margin of error; and Column H has the poll sample type (e.g., likely voters,
registered voters, or all adults). LV, RV, and A are often used as abbreviations for likely voters, registered voters, and all
adults, respectively. Vote shares and poll start and end dates (namely, Columns A, B, E, and F) are the only components
of this data [48] that we use in our models. The remaining columns occasionally have missing elements, because we
did not copy this information or because it was unavailable. (For example, the latter is sometimes the case for margin of
error.)
Data file S3: Polling data for the 2018 governor races: datafile GovernorPolls2018.xlsx. This is an Excel file with
the polling data that we collected from RealClearPolitics [48] for the 2018 governor races. We format the data in the
same way as for the Senate polls that we described above.
Data file S4: Model parameters: datafile ModelParameters.xlsx. This is an Excel file with the the model parameters
that we use in Eqns. [3–8] of the main text in our final forecasts for the 2012, 2016, and 2018 races that we presented in
the main paper. We fit the parameters to polling data that we obtained from HuffPost [47] and RealClearPolitics [48]; see
Materials and Methods in the main text for details. Each page in the Excel worksheet has the parameters for a different
election forecast. The pages appear in the following order: 2012 governor, 2012 Senate, 2012 president, 2016 governor,
2016 Senate, 2016 president, 2018 governor, and 2018 Senate. On a given page, each column has the transmission and
turnover (i.e., loss) parameters for the indicated state. (For example, Column B on page 3 has the parameters βRed,iR ,
βRed,iD , γ
Red
R , and γ
Red
D for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M for the 2012 presidential election.) In all cases, the column first gives the βR
parameters for Republican transmission, then gives the βD parameters for Democrat transmission, and finally gives the
turnover parameters γR and γD.
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